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PREFACE
The International Risk Governance Council (IRGC) is 
an independent non-profit organisation that provides 
policy makers, regulators, risk managers and other key 
decision-makers with evidence-based recommendations 
about risk governance. Our expertise lies in systemic and 
emerging risks that threaten human health and safety, the 
environment, the economy and society at large. IRGC 
recommendations recognise the scientiﬁc, political, 
social, and economic contexts of risks and opportunities 
as well as the challenges due to uncertainty, knowledge 
gaps, time constraints or policy trade-offs.
Many risks are complex, uncertain, and even 
ambiguous. In most cases, the potential beneﬁts and 
risks interconnect. Improvements in the management of 
risks are essential in order to take effective and efficient 
decisions and to improve public trust in risk management 
processes, structures and decisions.
The Risk Governance Framework was developed for 
IRGC by a team of risk experts chaired by Prof. Ortwin 
Renn, drawing on a broad analysis of evidence-based 
approaches to risk management. Its purpose is to provide 
methodological orientation and empirical evidence to use 
risk governance concepts. This generic and adaptable 
framework can be tailored to various risks and offers 
guidance for the development of comprehensive risk 
assessment and management strategies. A detailed 
description of the Framework was published in the 
2005 IRGC white paper Risk Governance – Towards an 
Integrative Approach. 
Building on this work and on feedback from practical 
applications, IRGC’s 2009 report on Risk Governance 
Deficits: An analysis and illustration of the most common 
deficits in risk governance focused on the sources of 
governance deficits and their constructive assessment 
and management. Further to this, IRGC produced a 
series of publications to address emerging risks, in 
particular: Contributing Factors to Risk Emergence 
(2010) and Emerging Risk Governance Guidelines (2015). 
These publications expand the main Risk Governance 
Framework to address issues specific to emerging risks. 
Work on guidelines for the governance of systemic risks 
is also under way.
This introduction to the IRGC Risk Governance 
Framework summarises the main points of the white 
paper, identifies potential deﬁcits in the risk governance 
process and illustrates their manifestation with examples.
More information about IRGC and the IRGC Risk 
Governance Framework is available at www.irgc.org.
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2 See Appendix 1: About roadmaps for precision medicine.
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Risk can be defined in different ways, for instance based on societal agreements 
(e.g. organisational, scientific and technical disciplines conventions) or the 
sector of application (e.g. finance, health, environment, or business). In 
order to be useful, a definition of risk must enable the evaluation of various 
dimensions pertinent to the field of that risk (see Box 8) and comparisons 
between risks and options for managing them.
IRGC has adopted a broad definition relevant to the governance of a wide 
range of risks: Risk refers to uncertainty about and the severity of the 
consequences of an activity or event with respect to something that humans 
value. Uncertainty can pertain to the type of consequences, the likelihood 
of these occurring (often expressed in probabilities), the severity of the 
consequences or the time or location where and when these consequences 
may occur 1. This definition accommodates both desirable (positive) and 
undesirable (negative) outcomes but most organisations focus on the negative 
outcomes. 
THE NEED FOR  
RISK GOVERNANCE
1 Aven and Renn (2009) and the SRA Glossary (2015) have further defined risk.
In today’s world, risks and systems are deeply inter-connected. 
It has proven useful in the risk community to distinguish 
between conventional and systemic risks. Conventional risks 
are characterised by a well-known probability distribution over 
a limited scope of adverse effects. In contrast, the concept of 
systemic risk refers to the risk or probability of breakdowns 
in an entire system, because of high levels of connectivity, 
major uncertainties and ambiguities, and non-linear cause-
effect relationships. Risks are increasingly systemic, and can 
seriously threaten the functionality of critical systems, which 
are essential to the economy and/or society. Systemic risks 
are embedded in the larger context of societal, ﬁnancial and 
economic change. Such risks cannot be managed through 
the actions of a single sector, but require the involvement 
of different stakeholders, including governments, industry, 
academia, and members of civil society. Some systemic 
risks can even have ‘global’ impacts, requiring coordinated 
management approaches at local, regional, national and 
international levels. (OECD, 2003)
Box 1: From conventional to systemic risks
Governance refers to the actions, processes, traditions and institutions 
by which authority is exercised and collective decisions are taken and 
implemented.
Risk governance applies the principles of governance to the identiﬁcation, 
assessment, management, evaluation and communication of risks in the 
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context of plural values and distributed authority. It includes all important 
actors involved, considering their rules, conventions and processes. It is 
thus concerned with how relevant risk information is collected, analysed, 
understood and communicated, and how management decisions are taken 
and communicated. Risk governance mobilises both descriptive issues (how 
decisions are made) as well as normative concepts (how decisions should be 
made). In its application as a normative concept it specifies the principles of 
good governance. These principles include transparency, effectiveness and 
efﬁciency, accountability, strategic focus, sustainability, equity and fairness, 
respect for the rule of law, and the need for the chosen solution to be politically 
and legally feasible as well as ethically and publicly acceptable.
Decision-makers may defensibly choose to take risks to obtain the associated 
benefits. Indeed, risk-taking may be crucial to achieving technological 
innovation, economic development and social welfare. Many risks, and in 
particular those arising from emerging technologies, are accompanied by 
potential beneﬁts and opportunities. The challenge of better risk governance 
lies in enabling societies to beneﬁt from opportunities while minimising the 
negative consequences of the associated risks.
Therefore, attempts to govern risks often face the following challenges:
• A lack of appropriate methods, or differing approaches and protocols for 
assessing and managing the same risks across countries, organisations 
and social groups.
• Inadequate consideration of risk-benefit as well as risk-risk trade-offs, or 
inequitable distribution of risks and beneﬁts between stakeholders.
• Failure to understand secondary consequences of specific risks and 
the interconnections among consequences and between risks and 
opportunities.
• A need to regulate and take policy decisions under considerable time 
pressure, while facing uncertainty, incomplete information, difficult policy 
trade-offs affecting the various stakeholders differently, and the need to 
reduce regulatory burden.
• Difficulties to estimate the cost of policies, strategies or regulations, which 
furthermore may sometimes be inefﬁcient or ineffective.
• Inappropriate involvement of different stakeholder groups, and lack of 
consideration for public opinion.
• Loss of public trust in risk management, whether by industry or 
policymakers and regulators.
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The IRGC Framework recommends a holistic, multidisciplinary and multi-
stakeholder approach to risk. It supports processes that aim to provide 
and structure scientific evidence about a risk in a societal context. It helps 
decision-makers analyse the major ambiguities and controversies that may 
affect the management of a risk. 
The Framework provides guidance to cope with risks in situations of high 
complexity, uncertainty or ambiguity. It can support the detection of current 
or potential deﬁcits within the risk governance process, and provide guidance 
for their remediation. Its application enables decision-makers to act on the 
basis of evidence, transparent assumptions, and broad societal values 
and interests. The IRGC Framework can help analysts raise the relevant 
questions when dealing with uncertainty and political and cultural ambiguities. 
Moreover, the Framework is designed to increase the capacity to deal with 
unanticipated consequences of risk, unknown impacts and social conflicts 
over trade-offs.2 While recognising the upside of risk is important, the Risk 
Governance Framework focuses on managing the negative and unintended 
consequences of a risk.  
Risk governance is not just about risk management. It starts at the earlier 
stage of risk pre-assessment, in which the essential perspectives of the 
problem are identiﬁed early and broadly, particularly regarding how the risk is 
framed by different stakeholders and whether or not there are any applicable 
legal or other rules or processes.
While risk assessment remains a central (technical) part of risk governance, 
this approach also urges risk governance institutions to gather not only 
knowledge about the physical, economic and social impacts of technologies, 
natural events or human activities but also knowledge about the concerns 
that people associate with causes and consequences of risks.
KEY ASPECTS OF  
THE IRGC FRAMEWORK
2 The Framework elaborates from earlier and technical work on risk management. The 2005 IRGC white paper includes a list of 
other initiatives and publications. Since the publication of the IRGC Framework, other guidance documents or frameworks have 
been published, such as ISO principles for risk management (ISO 31000), some of them in institutional contexts (OECD, UNISDR). 
Most of those frameworks share similar principles but applied to various contexts. The field of risk management (or risk analysis) is 
developing to address new challenges in technologies, society or the economy. For example, the Board on Environmental Studies 
and Toxicology of the Division on Earth and Life Studies, at the US National Academies of Sciences, Engineering and Medicine 
recognised the need to improve chemical risk assessment by using better new scientific and technical advances. Its publication 
“Using 21st Century Science to Improve Risk-Related Evaluations” reflects on such advances and suggests recommendation to 
improve risk assessment. (NAS, 2017) Given the diversity of disciplines involved in risk management and fields of application, a 
group of risk analysis experts at the Society for Risk Analysis published in 2015–2017 a series of papers and a glossary, to support 
the development of the risk analysis field in a way that reflects the variety of applications but at the same time aims to bring cohesion 
to the field. (SRA, 2017).
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To help achieve effective risk management and meaningful engagement with 
stakeholders, IRGC recommends a characterisation of risks (whether they 
originate from natural, technological, economic or environmental causes) 
depending on the knowledge available to address them: predominantly 
simple, complex, uncertain, ambiguous or a combination thereof. On this 
basis, a sound risk evaluation will be possible, leading to robust decision-
making and implementation of risk governance measures. 
In addition to the standard elements of risk assessment and management, IRGC 
also emphasises the crucial role of communication and public involvement. 
This includes not only informing people of a risk or risk management decision, 
but also establishing the two-way dialogue needed at all stages of the risk 
governance process – including communication between those responsible 
for taking risk-related decisions and those responsible for providing the 
knowledge on which the decisions are based.
An inclusive and open communication process is particularly important 
for the engagement of stakeholders in the assessment of perceptions 
and concerns and in risk-related decision-making and conﬂict resolution. It 
ensures that stakeholders make informed choices about the risk, balancing 
evidence-based knowledge about it with their own interests, concerns, beliefs 
and resources.
Finally, the IRGC Framework incorporates considerations to reﬂect the need 
to deal with risk in a way that fully accounts for the societal context of both 
the risk and the decision about it. For instance, it is necessary to accept and 
account for the variety of risk and regulatory cultures and styles around the 
world, as these will require different methods for, particularly, management 
and communication processes. Also, as risk cultures vary (for example, 
over time and according to the level of economic development), timing is a 
key criterion. Indeed, what is possible now in one environment may not be 
possible elsewhere; and what is not feasible today may be feasible tomorrow.
The IRGC Risk Governance Framework is a generic resource meant to be 
tailored to the specific context and needs of each risk governing organisation. 
The Framework as a whole or specific parts of it are often used as a basis or 
inspiration for an organisation to develop its own risk management framework 
(cf. Appendix 2: Application to Institutional Risk Management).
The Framework can contribute to improving risk management practices that 
go beyond conventional risk analysis and management by incorporating 
societal values, concerns and perceptions of risk. By looking into the 
interactions between the various affected stakeholders, it can help achieve 
more effective risk governance strategies. Eventually, the Framework can 
contribute to global efforts to harmonise risk governance approaches and 
ﬁnd common denominators for risk handling in a globalised and plural world.
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THE IRGC RISK 
GOVERNANCE FRAMEWORK
SUMMARY DESCRIPTION
The IRGC Framework provides guidance for early identification and handling 
of risks, involving multiple stakeholders. It is a comprehensive approach to 
help understand, analyse and manage important risk issues for which there 
can be deﬁcits in risk governance structures and processes. The Framework 
comprises interlinked elements, with three cross-cutting aspects (see Figure 
1 and Figure 2):
1. Pre-assessment – Identification and framing; setting the boundaries of 
the risk or system.
2. Appraisal – Assessing the technical and perceived causes and 
consequences of the risk.
3. Characterisation and evaluation – Making a judgment about the risk and 
the need to manage it.
4. Management – Deciding on and implementing risk management options
5. Cross-cutting aspects – Communicating, engaging with stakeholders, 
considering the context.
Figure 1: Simplified visual representation of the IRGC Risk Governance Framework.
Deciding Understanding
Pre-assessment
Characterisation
and Evaluation
AppraisalManagement
Cross-cutting Aspects
Communication
Stakeholder engagement
Context
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Figure 2: Detailed visual representation of the IRGC Risk Governance Framework.
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IRGC’s Risk Governance Framework distinguishes between understanding 
a risk (for which risk appraisal is the essential procedure) and deciding what 
to do about a risk (where risk management is the key activity). This distinction 
reﬂects IRGC’s support for the clear separation of the responsibilities for risk 
appraisal and management as a means of maximising the objectivity and the 
accountability of both activities. Those responsible for both should be jointly 
involved in the other three elements: pre-assessment, characterisation and 
evaluation, and cross-cutting aspects.
The interlinked elements are summarised in the following pages. Together, 
they provide a means to gain a thorough understanding of a risk and to 
develop adequate and appropriate options for governing it.
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1.
PRE-ASSESSMENT
IRGC’s approach begins with risk pre-assessment, which leads to framing 
the risk, early warning, and preparations for handling it. Pre-assessment 
involves relevant actors and stakeholder groups, so as to capture the various 
perspectives on the risk, its associated opportunities, and potential strategies 
for addressing it. 
The subprime financial crisis which started in 2007 led to 
severe recessions in many countries with long-term negative 
impacts in many sectors. Critics have focused on the 
inadequacies of the banking sector and failing regulations, 
but many important issues have been overlooked. A pre-
assessment of the risk would have framed financial risks as 
systemic, or deeply embedded within the economy of many 
countries. In the US and elsewhere, imbalances were likely 
created over the years. The numerous factors included weak 
Box 2: Pre-assessment – Subprime crisis in the USA
regulations, political pressure to encourage home ownership 
among lower-income households, and the opacity of financial 
products. 
It is important to identify these various sources and 
dimensions of risk as well as the different stakeholders 
involved, even before full risk assessment starts. Thereby, 
risk pre-assessment contributes to a broader understanding 
of a risk and can lead to the development of more integrated 
solutions than a narrow focus on regulation would propose.
Pre-assessment clariﬁes the various perspectives on a risk, deﬁnes the issues 
to be looked at, and forms the baseline for how a risk is assessed and 
managed. It captures and describes both:
• The variety of issues that stakeholders and society may associate with a 
certain risk (and the related opportunities).
• Existing indicators, routines and conventions that may help narrow down 
what is to be addressed as the risk, as well as the manner in which it 
should be addressed.
The main questions in pre-assessment are:
• What are the risks and opportunities that we are addressing?
• Who are the stakeholders? How do their views affect the deﬁnition and 
framing of the problem? What are the organisational issues and power 
relations between them?
• Does the risk mobilise different stakeholders?
• What are the various dimensions of the risk?
• How are the boundaries of the evaluation defined, in terms of scope, 
scale or time horizon?
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• Are there indications that there is already a problem? Is there a need to act?
• What are the established scientiﬁc and analytical tools and methods that 
can be used to assess the risks? Do we need new research protocols to 
characterise the risks?
• What are the current legal/regulatory systems and how do they potentially 
affect the problem?
• Does the organisation use foresight or horizon scanning for the identification 
of emerging risks?
• What is the organisational capability of the relevant governments, 
international organisations, businesses and people involved?
Potential governance deﬁcits in pre-assessment:
• Warning – Signals of a known risk have not been detected or recognised 
(complacency bias, false positive and false negative)
• Scope – A risk which is perceived as having only local consequences may 
in fact be much broader (and vice-versa)
• Framing – Different stakeholders may have conﬂicting views on the issue 
(including contesting views about the desirability of the benefits)
• ‘Black swans’ (surprising extreme events  relative to our knowledge) – No 
awareness of a hazard or possible risk
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3 The fact of being subject to a risk source/agent.
4 The degree to which a system is affected by a risk source or agent, or able to withstand specific loads.
2.
APPRAISAL 
(ASSESSMENT)
Risk appraisal develops and synthesises the knowledge base for the decision 
on whether or not a risk should be taken and/or managed and, if so, what 
options are available for preventing, mitigating, adapting to or sharing the risk. 
Risk appraisal goes beyond the conventional scientiﬁc risk assessment and 
comprises both: 
• A risk assessment – An assessment of the risk’s factual, physical and 
measurable characteristics, which aims to identify and describe the 
possibility of occurrence or a probability distribution over a range of 
negative consequences, considering the hazard as well as the exposure 3 
and vulnerability 4 of the values or assets that must be protected. 
• A concern assessment – An assessment of different stakeholders’ opinions 
and concerns about the risk, a systematic analysis of the associations 
and perceived consequences (beneﬁts and risks) that stakeholders may 
associate with a hazard, its cause(s) and consequence(s).
Risk and concern assessments need to be based on state-of-the-art scientific 
methodologies. They involve the physical sciences (such as toxicology, 
epidemiology, engineering science or natural sciences) as well as human 
and social sciences (such as sociology, psychology, political sciences, 
anthropological or behavioural sciences). 
With respect to the type and collection of data, risk assessors can be informed 
by big data (large scale data sets that can provide evidence on correlations 
between risk elements and thus help understand complex phenomena), 
the use of predictive analytics (a type of statistical techniques used in 
predictive modelling, machine learning and data mining that analyse current 
and historical facts to make predictions about future or otherwise unknown 
events), or social media (which can provide information about public opinion 
and the emergence of new phenomena).
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The North Sea herring fishery suffered a severe collapse in 
1975 after regulators ignored early warning signs that fish 
stocks were very low. The fishery was therefore closed. Upon 
re-opening of the herring fishery in 1981, efforts were made 
to improve the continuous assessment and management of 
fish stocks. In 1995, early warning signs once again showed 
that fish stocks were becoming dangerously low. However, 
quick and drastic action to impose quotas was taken to avoid 
another collapse and, by 2003, the stock had recovered 
Box 3: Risk and concern assessment – Assessing risks and concerns in fisheries depletion
without even requiring temporary closures of the fishery. An 
important reason for the success was the combination of a 
scientific assessment of the risk, using knowledge gathered 
and shared from earlier collapses about the behaviour of fish 
stocks, and an assessment of the concerns of fishermen and 
industry, which would have been affected by a new collapse, 
even if in the medium term only. Affected stakeholders were 
involved in the decision to restore quotas, which led to short-
term losses but avoided larger collapse.
2.1 Risk assessment 
The IRGC Framework distinguishes between the source of the risk and its 
impact:
• On the source side, it considers the risk agent (source system), i.e. the 
hazard that has the potential to cause harm (e.g. a poisonous chemical).
• On the impact side, it considers the risk absorbing system, i.e. the assets 
that could be exposed to the risk agent.
Risk is hence a composition of the potential to cause harm by the risk agent, 
the possibilities of being exposed to this agent and the vulnerability of the risk-
absorbing system (amount of stress that the system can tolerate). Furthermore, 
risk expresses the relative likelihood that such harm is experienced.
Scientiﬁc risk assessment deals with the following questions:
• What are the potential damages or adverse effects associated with the 
risk? How ubiquitous could the damage be? How persistent? Can it be 
reversed? 
• What are the processes that create and control risk?
• How vulnerable is the risk-absorbing system with respect to the stress 
that the risk agent inflicts on it?
• What accident scenarios can occur? What about their severity, kinetics, 
probability of occurrence, etc.? 
• Can the risk be quantified (e.g. as a function of probability and severity)?
• What is the degree of confidence in the risk assessment, including its 
comprehensiveness (inclusion of all relevant factors) and accuracy? What 
is the level of robustness and validity of data and knowledge?
• How reliable are the probability estimates and how much uncertainty 
prevails?
• Do risk assessors use scenario development for prospective assessment 
of the risk?
Potential governance deﬁcits in risk assessment include:
• Lack of appropriate methods and models to assess potential harm (e.g. 
in the case of new technologies or cumulative exposure).
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• Scarcity of scientiﬁc data about the risk (risk agent and risk-absorbing 
system) and/or about stakeholders’ associated concerns.
• Inappropriate use of advanced assessment methods, such as those 
deriving from big data analytics, artificial intelligence, social media analysis, 
or citizen science.
2.2 Concern assessment
The concern assessment is a key feature of the IRGC Framework. It takes into 
account the values and socio-emotional issues that may be associated with 
the risks. It explicitly recognises that people’s decisions about how to handle 
risks are influenced by their past experience, their perception as well as their 
perhaps more emotional and value-based concerns. It is therefore essential 
to understand perceptions, values and concerns, as they not only determine 
the social and cultural ambiguity about a risk issue but also influence the 
attitudes toward risk and risk taking behaviour. With increasing complexity 
and interconnection between risks and benefits, it is often difficult for people 
to give meaning to situations or their experience. Attention must be paid to 
the collaborative process of sense-making, i.e. the process by which people 
give meaning to their experience, which can create situational awareness 
and understanding in situations of high complexity or uncertainty in order 
to make decisions. 
Concern assessment deals with such questions as:
• What are different stakeholders’ opinions, values and concerns about the 
risk? What is their level of involvement, accountability or responsibility?
• Are there cognitive or heuristic biases that affect the risk perception or 
concern? (see Box 4)
• Are there sociological, organisational and anthropological constraints on 
actors and stakeholders? 
• What is the social response to the risk? How do people react? Is there 
the possibility of political or social mobilisation?
• What role do existing institutions, governance structures and the media 
play in deﬁning and addressing public concerns? 
• Are risk managers likely to face controversies and conflicts due to 
differences in risk perception, in stakeholder objectives and values, or 
from inequities in the distribution of beneﬁts and risks?
Potential governance deﬁcits in concern assessment include:
• Misunderstanding about biases that may affect the perception of the risk.
• Low conﬁdence level in the data, the model or their interpretation.
• Inadequate attention given to the concerns of different stakeholder groups, 
and drivers of their behaviour.
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Behavioural insights can be extremely useful in understanding 
the predispositions that affect how people take decisions and 
then build on those biases to help obtain a better outcome. 
Biases and intuitive heuristics relate to processing information 
on risk aspects such as exposure, probability or uncertainty. 
Biases that individuals often apply to judge risks or to draw 
inferences from probabilistic information include (Renn, 2008) 
(Kahneman, 2013):
• Availability – Events that come to people’s mind immediately 
(e.g. events highlighted in the mass media) are rated as more 
probable than events that are less in their thoughts. In food 
consumption behaviour, if people have a tendency to grab 
the first food they see (due to the availability heuristic or 
satisficing choice strategies), then it is recommended that 
they see the healthy food first. 
• Status quo or choice avoidance – People have a tendency 
not to change their behaviour. If their inclination is to stick 
with the default option that is proposed to them, then 
authorities or risk managers need to make sure that the 
default option is the one that is best suited for them.
• Anchoring effect – Probabilities are not adjusted to 
sufficiently take into account new information when it 
becomes available. People retain the perceived significance 
Box 4: Cognitive biases that affect how individuals perceive risks and behave in risk situations
of the initial information so that, for example, if they associate 
eating fish with heavy metal contamination, they are likely 
to ignore that eating fish, even lightly contaminated, is still 
healthier than eating red meat. 
• Personal experience – Single events either experienced 
directly by people, or in associated circumstances, are 
considered more typical than the information related to 
the actual frequencies of those events. People who, by 
chance, have observed that woman drivers were involved 
in the last two accidents they witnessed are likely to infer 
that women cause more accidents (which, in fact, is not 
true).
• Avoidance of cognitive dissonance – In an attempt 
to attenuate cognitive dissonance, information which 
challenges perceived probabilities that are already part 
of a belief system will either be ignored or minimised. 
Autonomous cars are perceived to be less safe because 
the overriding belief is that humans are better drivers 
than machines, even though experts demonstrate that, in 
general, machines cause fewer accidents than humans. In 
the case of autonomous vehicles, industry and regulators 
will need to communicate more clearly to explain why those 
can be safer than conventional ones.
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3.
CHARACTERISATION 
AND EVALUATION
Risk evaluation is the process of comparing the outcome of risk appraisal (risk 
and concern assessment) with specific criteria, to determine the significance 
and acceptability of the risk, and to prepare decisions. Characterising the 
knowledge about a risk can help evaluate it. 
3.1 Knowledge characterisation
Risks differ in a number of dimensions (see Box 8), which have an influence 
on the way they are assessed and managed. During the risk appraisal 
phase a considerable amount of knowledge is developed about a risk. That 
knowledge is important in order to characterise it as being predominantly 
simple, complex, uncertain or ambiguous, or (most often) a combination 
thereof. Doing so can assist in planning for the participation of stakeholders in 
the risk governance process (see Figure 5), and in designing risk management 
strategies (see Figure 4). 
For relatively simple risks, such as risk of car or plane accidents, the beneﬁts 
of taking regulatory action may be straightforward and uncontroversial, for 
example with compulsory seat belts in cars and flight recorders in planes. 
However, more complex, uncertain or ambiguous risks require a different 
approach to risk assessment, evaluation and management, with respect to 
the perceptions and values associated with those risks. In these risk situations, 
more comprehensive involvement of stakeholders will be needed. It should also 
be recognised that the characteristics of risks can shift over time, a factor that 
should be taken into account especially for longer risk governance processes. 
Complexity 
Complexity refers to difficulties in identifying and quantifying the causes of 
speciﬁc adverse effects, and understanding a sociotechnical system. Examples 
of complex risks include the risks of disruption of interconnected infrastructures, 
such as large electricity grids or the Internet. Complex issues can normally 
be handled by scientific and empirical research and expert technical work.
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Uncertainty 
Uncertainty refers to a lack of scientiﬁc or technical data, or a lack of clarity or 
quality of the data. Uncertainty describes the level of confidence that analysts 
associate with a qualitative or quantitative assessment of a specific risk. 
Uncertain risks include the effect of some developments in biotechnology, 
for example if new organisms are released into the open environment before 
a complete assessment of their potential impact.
Infrastructures are ‘critical’ when they provide basic services 
without which societies and economies cannot function 
normally. Electricity, gas, water, rail and communication 
infrastructures are good examples of critical infrastructure that 
are indispensable. While each of these infrastructures has its 
own basic weaknesses, their vulnerability is further increased 
by their mutual interdependence or ‘coupling’. For example, 
the delivery of health care services relies on the electric power 
network, which itself relies on the availability of energy as a fuel 
(an increase share of this being from renewable intermittent 
Synthetic biology is the design and construction of new 
biological systems not found in nature. It offers great promise 
in areas such as health and medicine, chemical manufacturing 
and energy generation. However, uncertainties about the 
potential risks and benefits of new products, as well as the 
effectiveness of future regulatory systems, may raise concerns 
among stakeholders. The IRGC policy brief “Guidelines for 
the Appropriate Risk Governance of Synthetic Biology”, 
published in 2010, provides suggestions for identifying the 
uncertainties and trade-offs that need to be made between 
enabling innovation, minimising risk to people and the 
Box 5: Complexity - Critical infrastructure (CI)
Box 6: Uncertainty – Synthetic Biology
sources). Although the intrinsic design of CI includes built-
in capacity for reliability, CI are increasingly prone to failure 
because of the high levels of complexity inherent in the design 
of their systems, interdependency and tight coupling, with 
little redundancy and back-up. Failure in one infrastructure can 
rapidly cascade through an entire system and cause a major 
failure elsewhere. Identifying and quantifying the causes and 
consequences of disruptions is often difficult and problematic.
environment, and balancing the interests and values of all 
relevant stakeholders. The policy brief argues that regulation 
must not simply prohibit or restrict any development for which 
uncertainty exists but should seek the right balance between 
potential benefits and threats. Such an endeavour requires the 
active participation of many stakeholders potentially affected. 
In the case of gene drives (a technology that spreads biased 
inheritance of particular genes to alter entire population) early 
engagement with stakeholders and adaptive governance 
approaches are advised (see Appendix 3).
Ambiguity 
Ambiguity results from divergent perspectives on the risk, including the 
likelihood and severity of potential adverse outcomes. Risks that are subject 
to high levels of ambiguity include issues for which economic or ethical issues 
matter and where controversies and polemics can emerge, such as in the 
case of food production, the use of hormones or antibiotics as a growth 
promoter for cattle, or some developments in genomic research. In these 
cases, people’s values and interests can differ widely and create conditions 
for contestation or conflict.
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Ambiguity is well illustrated by the controversy that 
surrounds the scientific evidence or lack of evidence 
regarding consequences of using genetically modified (GM) 
organisms, and therefore the global debate about genetically 
modified crops. Europe has been caught between conflicting 
perspectives from industry, which has been promoting the 
benefits of this technological innovation, and the public, 
who have expressed concerns about harmful consequences 
and doubts about sustainable benefits. As a result of the 
Several dimensions typically inﬂuence the risk governance 
process.
At the most basic level, risks sources can be of three types, 
natural phenomena, human activity or a combination of 
the two 5: 
• Outcomes from natural phenomena become risks (with 
negative consequences) only when they impact on what is 
important to basic conditions of life on earth (e.g. services 
provided by ecosystems), or on the well-being of humans. 
• Risks that arise from human activity may be unintended 
or poorly managed consequences of activities undertaken 
(or decisions made) for other purposes (e.g. driving a car), 
or they may derive from intentional harm such as fraud or 
terrorism (e.g. cyber security risks).
Several dimensions relate to the risk itself, for example:
• Degree of novelty – Is the risk emerging*, re-emerging, 
increasing in importance, current (topical) or institutionalised 
(already subject to management decisions)?
• Scope – is the risk local, dispersed, trans-boundary or 
global?
• Range – Does the risk impact on human health and safety, 
the environment, capital assets, trade, etc?
• Time horizon – What is the timeframe available for analysing 
a risk?
• Type of hazard – Is it ubiquitous, persistent and/or 
irreversible?
• Delay – Is there a long-time span between the trigger of the 
risk and its effects (latency)?
• For the risks introduced by developments in science and 
technology – Is the change incremental or breakthrough?
Box 7: Ambiguity - Genetically modified crops 
Box 8: Different dimensions of risk
fundamentally different perspectives, ambiguity has arisen. 
Evidence produced by companies to support product 
registration has been regarded as suspect by the public 
and is carefully scrutinised by regulators. Consequently, the 
European Commission initially ruled that a precautionary 
approach was necessary. It is only in 2015 that the EU 
Directive (2015/412) gave Member States the possibility to 
restrict or prohibit the cultivation of GM crops authorised by 
the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) for their territory.
Other dimensions have an influence on the way risks are 
assessed and managed. These reflect the fact that risk is a 
human, an organisational and a social construct. According 
to this, the risk perception differs: 
• Does handling the risk require international cooperation?
• Does it meet or violate important societal values, business 
prospects, equity concerns, security requirements, or trade 
agreements?
• Is the risk transferable or insurable?
• What is the level of public concern and stakeholder 
involvement?
• What type of regulatory framework is in place: Regulation/
standards/guidelines/laissez-faire? At which level (national/
international)? What is the level of compliance?
• Are there public-private partnerships in place for the 
management of the risk? What is the degree of public 
(governmental) regulation versus private (industry, self) 
regulation?
* Emerging risks. IRGC defines emerging risks as new risks 
(e.g. that derive from the use of new materials such as some 
nanomaterials), or familiar risks that become apparent in new 
or unfamiliar conditions (e.g. malaria in northern regions). This 
definition suggests that managers need to focus on the early 
detection and analysis of emerging risks’ triggers, including 
the development of familiar risks into new threats. Emerging 
risks are issues that are perceived to be potentially significant 
but which may not be fully understood and assessed, thus 
not allowing risk management options to be developed with 
confidence. Some raise questions of efficiency of conventional 
risk governance processes, as well as accountability and 
responsibility.
5 Cf. for example IRGC report on Emerging Risks: Sources, Drivers and Governance Issues (2010).
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3.2 Risk evaluation
Risk management requires a prior and careful judgment of whether or not 
a risk is acceptable to the decision-maker and stakeholders. If it is not 
acceptable, risk reduction measures may make it more tolerable. To make this 
judgement, the evidence based on the risk and concern assessment must be 
combined with a thorough evaluation of other factors such as societal values, 
economic interests and political considerations. After these considerations, 
risk is evaluated as:
• Acceptable, if risk reduction is considered unnecessary
• Tolerable, if the risk can be pursued because of its associated benefits, 
but subject to appropriate risk reduction measures
• Intolerable, if it must be simply avoided, i.e., no risk reduction measures 
can make it tolerable.
Evaluation involves making judgments and choices, which are often social, 
technical, economic, political or strategic, based on questions such as:
• Are there ethical issues to consider, beyond those taken into consideration 
in the concern assessment? 
• What are the societal values and norms for making judgments about 
tolerability and acceptability? Are these values and norms changing?
• Do any stakeholders – government, business or other – have commitments 
or other reasons for wanting a particular outcome of the risk governance 
process?
• What are the constraints (e.g. time, budget, context, etc.)?
• What is the political or strategic appreciation of the societal, economic 
and environmental beneﬁts and risks?
• Is there a possibility of substitution? If so, how do the risks compare?
Potential governance deﬁcits in risk evaluation:
• Overlooking outcomes from risk appraisal – Failing to fully consider social 
needs, environmental impacts, cost-beneﬁt analyses and risk-beneﬁt 
balances.
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Figure 3: Risk evaluation (IRGC, 2005)
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• Exclusion – When some stakeholders and their views or signiﬁcant beneﬁts 
and other consequences are excluded or omitted, whether advertently or 
inadvertently.
• Indecision – When there is lack of responsiveness, due to a voluntary act 
of authority or an involuntary failure in the decision-making process (e.g. 
overly inclusive process with stakeholders may lead to inertia).
• Lack of transparency and accountability – When trade-offs are not made 
explicit and resolved, and hidden agendas (including of experts involved) 
may determine the outcome of the evaluation process.
• Sustainability – When risk decision is not robust and relevant for a long 
period
The Internet of Things (IoT) drastically changes how individuals 
interact with objects, wherever those may be located. 
This creates significant opportunities for more efficiency, 
convenience and comfort and can improve performance and 
reduce inefficiencies in numerous sectors. Specific promising 
applications and gains include traffic efficiency thanks to 
connectivity between vehicles and with infrastructure, the 
provision of personal health care through implantable or 
wearable connected medical devices, and smart buildings. 
However, the safe and secure use of IoT is concerned with 
cyber security issues and vulnerabilities, with potential direct 
Whether or not a risk is perceived to be acceptable, tolerable 
or intolerable involves issues that go well beyond probabilities 
and statistics to include societal, political, economic and 
ethical considerations. This is well illustrated by the case of 
nuclear power. Most experts consider the risks from nuclear 
power to be of low probability but potentially devastating. 
The Fukushima accident in 2011 has refuelled fears of 
the catastrophic potential of nuclear accidents, and many 
countries thus responded by imposing moratoria or by 
What is considered an intolerable risk may vary across 
societies and jurisdictions, and may also change over time 
as technology develops and public perceptions shift. Ongoing 
advance in medical research make it increasingly likely that 
scientists will someday be able to genetically engineer 
humans to possess certain desired traits. However, such 
interventions may have undesired consequences and bear 
incalculable risk for humanity. As of 2017, many countries 
including France, Germany, Canada or Australia, ban gene 
Box 9: Acceptable risk – Internet of Things
Box 10: Tolerable risk – Nuclear power generation
Box 11: Intolerable risk and ambiguity – Human genome editing
negative impact on the physical safety and the security of IoT 
users, through the risk of being hacked, being infected with 
malware and being vulnerable to unauthorised access, which 
may trigger risks of a physical accident or adverse outcomes. 
Dependence on network connected technologies has grown 
faster than the means to secure applications. The balancing of 
risk and benefit is very complex, and may change in the future 
but, overall, users currently evaluate the risks they take, either 
intentionally or unintentionally, as acceptable. They prioritise 
comfort and convenience against security and privacy risks, 
which are generally considered as acceptable.
phasing out their nuclear program. And yet, what is intolerable 
in one country may be tolerable in others, which continue to 
support the development of new nuclear plants to satisfy their 
energy needs, control air pollution and reduce CO2 emissions. 
Identifying and understanding the factors and processes that 
may shape public acceptance of a particular risk is therefore 
critical for developing and implementing risk management 
decisions that are effective, legitimate, and in line with societal 
norms and values.
editing in human embryos. However, some countries and 
jurisdictions do not view human genome editing per se as an 
intolerable risk. China, for instance, does not forbid research 
on non-viable embryos, and in the UK, the Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Authority (HFEA) in 2016 approved an 
application by a London-based research team to carry out 
genome-editing technique CRISPR–Cas9 in healthy human 
embryos for the first seven days of development.
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4.
MANAGEMENT
Tolerable risks are risks that require appropriate and adequate risk 
management measures to address them. Risk management is a process 
that involves the design and implementation of the actions and remedies 
required to avoid, reduce (prevent, adapt, mitigate), transfer or retain the 
risks. Risk management includes the generation, assessment, evaluation and 
selection of appropriate management options, the decision about a specific 
strategy and options, and implementation.
Questions to ask in the management stage include:
• Who are the actors and stakeholders that should be involved in the risk 
management process? What is their level of responsibility for decisions 
about the risk and its management? Have they accepted this responsibility?
• What management options should be chosen (e.g. technological, 
regulatory, institutional, educational, transfer, compensation, etc.)? How are 
these options evaluated and prioritised? What are the evaluation criteria? 
What are the most efficient options for addressing each of the three major 
characterisations of risks (complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity)? 
• What are the likely impacts of particular risk-reduction options, their costs 
and benefits? 
• What potential trade-offs between risks, beneﬁts and risk-reduction 
measures may arise?
• Is there an appropriate level of international cooperation and harmonisation 
for global, trans-boundary or systemic risks?
• What measures are needed to ensure effectiveness in the long term 
(compliance, enforcement, monitoring, etc.)? In particular, does the risk 
management decision account for uncertainty and ambiguity, and does 
it enable some flexibility and adaptation if and when new knowledge is 
available?
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4.1 Making decisions about risk 
management strategies 
Good risk management relies on a process to facilitate systematic decision-
making:
• The generation of a range of risk management options: Different ways to 
manage the risk.
• The evaluation of those options with respect to pre-defined criteria such 
as effectiveness, efficiency, sustainability, etc. 
• The selection of options to be considered in the decision, based on a 
weighting of the assessment criteria and the trade-offs involved.
• The determination of a given risk management strategy. In case of high 
uncertainty or ambiguity, managers should consider the ability of the 
decision to perform well enough under various circumstances that may 
unfold in the future. Robust decisions are those that maintain enough 
flexibility for adaptation in the future and offer good performances for more 
than one possible development of the risk.
Risk management is confronted with the challenges of complexity, uncertainty 
and ambiguity. Based on this distinction one can identify four risk management 
strategies (for simple, complex, uncertain, ambiguous risks). Each of these 
four strategies is characterised by different processes and requirements for 
the choice of appropriate instruments, the inclusion of experts, stakeholders 
and the general public, and specific discourse arrangements (see Figures 
4 and 5):
• Simple risks can be managed using a routine-based strategy, such as 
introducing a law or regulation. Traditional decision-making frameworks 
implemented by risk regulatory agencies may be suitable for simple risks.
• Complex risks should be dealt with by risk-based decision-making involving 
internal or external experts and relying on scientific models. Complex risks 
can be addressed by acting on the best available scientiﬁc expertise and 
knowledge, aiming for a risk-informed and robustness-focused strategy. 
Robustness refers to the degree of reliability of the risk-reduction measures 
to withstand threatening events or processes even when those have not 
been fully understood or anticipated. A system is robust to uncertainty if 
specified goals are achieved despite information gaps.
• Uncertain risks should be managed using precaution-based strategies to 
avoid exposure to a risk source with large uncertainties, and resilience-
focused strategies 6 to reduce the vulnerability of the risk-absorbing 
systems. Precautionary approaches must be considered when the 
consequences of an activity could be very serious and are subject to 
high uncertainty. Such approaches aim to ensure the reversibility of critical 
decisions and to increase a system’s coping capacity to the point where it 
can withstand surprises. Resilience is the ability of the system to sustain or 
restore its basic functionality following a risk event. Resilience approaches 
aim to prepare, cope with and recover from unexpected surprises resulting 
from risk with high uncertainty about causes and impact, and potentially 
catastrophic consequences. Resilience building may include developing 
6 For resilience, s. also the IRGC Resource Guide on Resilience, available at https://www.irgc.org/irgc-resource-guide-on-resilience/
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the ability to adapt to new context conditions. In this context, resilience 
is a strategy against unknown or highly uncertain hazards, and concerns 
a whole system.
• Ambiguous risks require discourse-based decision-making involving all 
groups that have special interests or value commitments with respect to 
the risk or the benefits. Discourse-based strategies seek to create tolerance 
and mutual understanding of conﬂicting views and values with a view to 
eventually reconciling them.
 
Figure 4: Risk management 
strategies, adapted from (IRGC, 2005).Potential governance deﬁcits in the decision about a risk management 
strategy:
• Lack of responsibility – No entity is legally responsible for failures; risk 
management and regulation may ‘fall between the cracks’
• Lack of accountability – Decision-makers are isolated from the impact of 
their decision
• Unsustainability – E.g. short-term decisions lead to further longer-term 
problems
• Short-term expediency – Authority makes a decision on a knee-jerk or 
ad-hoc basis, for instance as a response to public pressure
• Indecision/lack of timeliness – Delays or inaction make matters worse
• Inequity – Decisions allot the risk and beneﬁts unfairly.
4.2 Implementation, monitoring and review
After the decision is made, mandate is given to implementation agencies 
to apply the selected measures, monitor their effectiveness, review the 
decisions if necessary and integrate feedback from the monitoring and review 
into possible revisions of the assessment and evaluation. It is important to 
establish a link between the outcome of risk management and the need to 
revise the initial assessment and the management decisions, if conditions 
have changed or if performance is lower than expected.
Supportive conditions for effective implementation include appropriate 
authority and leadership, communication (internal and external), attention 
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to possible organisational change that may be needed (to overcome frequent 
resistance to change), clear definition of roles, responsibilities and incentives, 
and the allocation of necessary resources.
Many governance deﬁcits originate from the lack of an appropriate legal or 
regulatory framework. Sometimes there is no appropriate structure or process. 
Alternatively, some regulatory structures overlap and compete with others, 
creating conﬂicts which complicate how risks are handled. Of particular 
interest today is how public and private regulation combine for effective and 
efficient outcome, and how public regulators can engage in planned adaptive 
governance to cope with uncertainty and rapid change (see Box 12).
Potential governance deﬁcits in implementation:
• Failing implementation – Decisions are ignored or poorly implemented.
• Lack of evaluation and feedback – Implementation is poorly evaluated, 
feedback is not integrated into review.
• Inappropriate use of advanced management tools, such as those deriving 
from artificial intelligence and machine-learning.
• Inﬂexibility – Failure to revisit a risk decision in the light of new knowledge.
Planned Adaptive Regulation (PAR) is an approach in which 
each regulation is designed from its initiation to learn from 
experience and update over time. In the face of uncertain 
or changing evidence that was used to underpin a rule, 
regulators plan both for scheduled adaptation of the rule 
and for the production of decision-relevant knowledge 
that will further characterise or reduce the uncertainties 
pertaining to the risk regulated. PAR is a policy tool that is 
too unfrequently considered. It is still rare to see a purposeful 
combination of (i) planning for future review and revision, 
(ii) monitoring of regulatory performance and impact, and 
(iii) funding of targeted research. Such research will be 
Box 12: Planned adaptive regulation as a risk management approach
organised in a way that is credibly overseen for quality and 
relevance, and that explicitly feeds into the reassessment 
of the knowledge base. PAR is appropriate to risk issues 
whose comprehensive assessment is evolving because 
of changes in the technologies or in context conditions. It 
has been used for the regulation of criteria pollutants in the 
atmosphere (in the US National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
(NAAQS) and the European Air Quality Standards), in the US 
Lautenberg Chemical Safety Act (LCSA) of June 2016, in flood 
management in the Netherlands, and in adaptive licensing of 
new drugs by the European Medicines Agency.
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5.
CROSS-CUTTING 
ASPECTS
Cutting across and at the core of the Framework, IRGC adds three aspects 
that are critical to the success of every risk governance process: the crucial 
role of open, transparent and inclusive communication, the importance of 
engaging stakeholders to both assess and manage risks, and the need to 
deal with risk in a way that fully accounts for the societal context of both 
the risk and the decision that will be taken.
5.1 Communication
Risk communication is the process of exchanging or sharing risk-related 
data, information and knowledge between and among different groups such 
as scientists, regulators, industry, consumers or the general public. It is of 
the utmost importance for effective risk governance. First, it enables risk 
assessors and risk managers to develop a common understanding of their 
tasks and responsibilities (internal communication). Second, it empowers 
stakeholders and civil society to understand the risk and the rationale for 
risk management (external communication). It allows stakeholders to make 
informed contributions to risk governance, recognises their role in the risk 
governance process and gives them a voice by creating a deliberate two-
way process. In many traditional risk management procedures, once the risk 
management decision is made, the role of communication is to explain the 
rationale for the policy decisions. In the IRGC Framework, communication is 
central in the process and crucial at each phase of pre-assessment, appraisal, 
evaluation and management. Indeed, effective and early communication 
is the key to creating long term trust in risk management, in particular 
when risks are perceived complex, uncertain or ambiguous.
Questions to address when developing communications:
Process
• Is there a facilitator in charge of the risk communication process?
• How can the communication process be organised and facilitated between 
and among regulators, risk assessors and other in-house experts (internal 
communication)?
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• How can communication be facilitated between risk takers, risk affected 
parties, other stakeholders, the media and risk managers (external 
communication)?
• How can communication be organised so that two-way information is 
effective, enlightening and timely?
Content
• What is known about the risk and the hazard, by whom, and how can it 
be conveyed to the interested stakeholders and the public?
• Does the communication take into account how the risk is perceived by 
the stakeholders?
• Are there ambiguities and controversies about the risk within the public 
sphere?
• What is the degree of conﬁdence in the risk managers responsible for 
generating or disseminating information, and for organising a dialogue?
• How to deal with confidential and sensitive information?
• What are the demands, needs and purposes for information and 
communication among the different stakeholder groups, including members 
of the general public?
• Are the concerns of stakeholders and the public being clearly articulated 
and are decision-makers listening?
• How is information interpreted by those who receive it?
• What has been and can be the role of the media, both traditional and 
social?
Potential governance deﬁcits in risk communication:
• One-way information instead of two-way communication prevents building 
a dialogue.
• Communication from experts is often too technical to be understood by 
lay people and stakeholders. Such communication may not address what 
stakeholders need and want to know. It may not account for how different 
stakeholders receive and accept information.
• Communication is not adapted to the category of risk (simple, complex, 
uncertain, ambiguous). For example, it does not convey uncertainty.
Six days before an earthquake hit the central Italian town of 
L’Aquila in 2009, seven members of the National Commission 
for the Forecast and Prevention of Major Risks took part 
in a meeting organised by the local authorities and civil 
protection. The meeting was called to analyse the danger 
posed by minor shocks that had been occurring for several 
weeks. While officials were hoping that the scientists would 
reassure the public, scientists informed the authorities about 
the uncertainty of the scientific evidence. On that basis, 
authorities urged the local residents to stay calm, stating that it 
was impossible to predict earthquakes and that the scientists 
had concluded that a major earthquake was not impending. 
The meeting and subsequent communication thus served 
Box 13: Risk communication – The case of the 2009 L’Aquila earthquake
to reassure the public and to reassert scientific authority in 
the public discourse. In the aftermath of the earthquake, the 
members of the commission were indicted and handed jail 
terms on charges of manslaughter for providing unjustifiably 
reassuring advice. But in November 2015, the ruling was 
overturned on the grounds that the scientists could not be 
faulted for stating that there was no reason to think that the 
risk of a major earthquake had increased following the smaller 
tremors. 
This case raises the issue of the role of scientists in risk 
communication as well as the difficulty to convey scientific 
uncertainty to both decision-makers and the general public, 
in particular regarding low-probability high-impact events.
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• People’s or organisations’ concerns are treated as irrelevant or irrational; 
this may cause incomplete understanding of the full nature of risks as well 
as social mobilisation against the institution or the ﬁnal decision.
• Low level of conﬁdence or trust in the decision-making process, the 
information given or the communication channel weakens the whole 
process.
5.2 Stakeholder engagement  
for inclusive risk governance
Engaging stakeholders for assessing plural values and interests, designing 
effective risk management strategies, and managing risks can improve the 
relevance of the decision and performance of the outcome.
IRGC recommends that, beyond technical scientific risk assessment, 
a concern assessment should inform decisions about risk. A concern 
assessment examines how relevant stakeholders, including members of 
the general public, perceive the risk and its potential consequences. Both 
are relevant inputs to risk evaluation and risk management.
Stakeholders who could be impacted by the risk and the risk management 
measures should be involved in the process, because they have useful 
insights to contribute to the process of risk governance and the resulting 
management decisions. By systematically engaging stakeholders, risk 
governance becomes an inclusive exercise that incorporates a wide range 
of perspectives. It improves the knowledge about risk and its management 
and can thus increase the effectiveness, the fairness and the acceptability 
of the decisions that are made.
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In order to assess when and how to engage different stakeholders, and 
particularly the general public, IRGC recommends that decision-makers 
consider using the dominant characteristic of a risk as the basis for deciding 
on the appropriate level of stakeholder involvement in the process:
• When a risk is considered as simple, it may require relatively basic 
consultation with experts to decide which management option should be 
adopted. The risk governance response can be straightforward and routine. 
• By contrast, when a risk is evaluated as complex and uncertain, decisions 
about its management may beneﬁt from a wider dialogue amongst a 
broader range of experts and affected stakeholders. 
• For risks that are marked by high levels of ambiguity, involving civil society 
is recommended, in part to capture and reconcile the various existing 
perceptions of a risk and options for its management.
Potential governance deﬁcits in stakeholder involvement:
• Exclusion – Accidental or deliberate exclusion of stakeholders and/or 
their views.
• ‘Authority knows best’ – A deliberate refusal to communicate with other 
interested parties leads the stakeholders with power to make the decisions, 
irrespective of the need for consultation and dialogue.
• Ignoring the composition of complexity, uncertainty and ambiguity and 
designing a process that is either too inclusive (for rather trivial risks) or 
not inclusive enough (for ambiguous risks).
• Insufficient attention to changes in context and to stakeholders’ nature 
and expectations.
• ‘Paralysis by analysis’ – Selection of an overly inclusive process leads to 
inertia or indecision.
• Time pressure and time delay – The deliberative process is under time 
constraint or is diluted.
A decisive, coordinated international action involving 
governments and industry was instrumental in the success of 
both the Montreal Protocol conclusion and its implementation. 
The discovery and monitoring of the Antarctic ozone ‘hole’ 
raised concerns about negative impacts on the climate, 
environment and public health. In 1985, CFCs were found 
responsible for the depletion of the stratospheric ozone layer. 
Only two years later, the Montreal Protocol was signed to 
regulate the production of ozone-depleting substances and 
Box 14: Reaching agreement through stakeholder engagement – Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)  
and the Montreal Protocol 
schedule their phasing-out. As a consequence, the 2005 levels 
of ozone-depleting gases in the stratosphere showed an 8-9% 
decrease from their peak values in 1992-94. The success 
of the Montreal Protocol can be attributed to international 
organisations engaging with all actors with a stake in the 
issue, including the industrial, scientific and political groups, 
who came together to work out a solution and negotiated a 
specific, detailed, and forward-looking agreement.
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One of the key factors surrounding the risk governance of 
unconventional gas development is that various interest 
groups frame very differently the issue, and therefore the 
associated opportunities and risks. Their opinions, concerns 
and expectations vary widely. For example, the oil and gas 
industry is driven by economic motives, national policy 
makers are often driven by considerations of energy security, 
sustainability and affordability issues, and local communities 
are concerned about the possible impact on the local 
environment, public health, displacement and employment. 
The various actors and their different objectives, needs and 
constraints must be identified before specific risk assessment 
can start. The case of how pilot testing of hydraulic fracturing 
In order to provide further guidance to practitioners and 
academics, for developing and implementing science-based 
stakeholder involvement in research, policy, strategies and 
practices, in 2013, IRGC produced an annotated resource 
guide for stakeholder engagement. The guide reviews existing 
manuals, providing background information on the various 
Box 15: The importance of engaging stakeholders – The case of unconventional gas development
Box 16: IRGC Stakeholder Engagement Resource Guide
was stopped in Germany (as well as other countries or US 
states) in the years 2014–2016 illustrates the role of local 
communities. Operators underestimated the importance of 
involving those in their assessment of context conditions for 
the exploitation of shale gas resources. Local communities 
mobilised against pilot projects, and operators cancelled their 
plans. 
Inclusive risk management decisions require a balancing of 
various interests and views held by different stakeholders. The 
neglect of any important factor, group or evidence can lead to 
an inappropriate decision and the failure of risk management 
actions.
perspectives. It emphasises the importance of determining 
the main objective and the expected outcome or contributions 
that engaging with stakeholders aim to achieve, before 
choosing the type of method that will be used to involve 
stakeholders. stakeholder.irgc.org.
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Figure 6: Objectives of engaging stakeholders.
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5.3 The importance of context
Alongside the conventional elements of risk assessment, risk management 
and risk communication, the IRGC Framework stresses that the broader 
social, institutional, political and economic contexts must be taken into 
account in risk-related decision making. It is important to recognise the 
organisational capacity, which refers to the capability of key actors in the 
risk governance process to fulﬁl their roles, the network of actors, and the 
political cultures or the governmental and regulatory ‘styles.’ Also important is 
the risk culture, which impacts on the level of risk tolerance (or risk aversion), 
and the degree of trust in the institutions responsible for risk governance.
Political and regulatory culture
different regulatory styles
Social climate
trust in regulatory institutions,
perceived authority of science,
civil society involvement, risk culture
Actor network
politicians, regulators, industry/
business, NGOs, media,
public at large
Organisational capacity
assets, skills, capabilities
Core risk governance
process
pre-assessment, risk appraisal,
risk and concern assessments,
evaluation tolerability/acceptability
judgement, risk management,
communication
Figure 7: Risk governance in context.
Growing biomass for producing energy (heat, electricity or 
liquid fuel) has been the focus of great interest in the years 
2000-2010. After much enthusiasm in many countries, 
research, experimentation and deployment, scientists, policy 
makers and industry have finally come to the conclusion that 
it is important to have a full understanding of the context in 
which biomass could be produced. Practices and policies will 
thus need to differ between countries. Countries vary in their 
energy needs and production capacity, agricultural and forestry 
practices, climate change impact, technological capacities, 
and economic and social conditions. Therefore, policies must 
Box 17: Importance of context – Risks related to the production of biomass for energy 
rely on sound and comprehensive environmental, climate, 
economic and social impact assessments, and may prioritise 
different objectives, such as reducing carbon emissions, 
enhancing national energy security and independence, or 
catalysing rural economic development. It is also important 
to recognise that the involved stakeholders may defensibly 
have different values and priorities. In the face of the same 
scientiﬁc data, some may for example view bioenergy as a 
threat to the security of food supplies while others may view 
bioenergy as a potential source of new income. Policies may 
thus vary widely across countries.
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CONCLUSION
The IRGC Risk Governance Framework provides guidance to risk assessors, 
risk managers and overall those who organise the process by which risks can 
be identified, analysed, understood, and eventually addressed in a fair and 
effective manner. It can help institutions to structure their tasks, and design 
their own specific frameworks, adapted to their own sectoral or organisational 
contexts and specificities. The Famework is modular, compatible with and 
complementary to other models for risk management. It can be used as 
both a ‘meta-model’ or as a set of dynamic guidelines for implementing 
comprehensive, inclusive and ﬂexible risk governance processes. 
In particular, it recommends the integration of knowledge and action across 
silos and various levels of governance. It goes beyond conventional risk 
analysis and management by incorporating societal values, concerns and 
perceptions of risk. By looking into the interactions between the various 
affected stakeholders, it can contribute to achieving more effective risk 
governance strategies.
Readers of this introduction can also find some assistance to diagnose 
deﬁcits in current risk governance processes and suggestions for how to 
prevent them or improve their remediation.
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APPENDIX 1
ADDITIONAL INFORMATION 
AND FOLLOW-UP WORK 
ABOUT THE FRAMEWORK
Interested readers can learn more about the basis for the development of 
the IRGC Risk Governance Framework, including a detailed description of 
the Framework, in the IRGC White Paper No.1 (2005), available from www.
irgc.org/risk-governance/irgc-risk-governance-framework.
Additional information is available in Global Risk Governance – Concept and 
Practice Using the IRGC Framework (IRGC, 2008). This volume includes 
critiques of the Framework provided by internationally renowned experts 
on risk governance, applications of the Framework to speciﬁc risk issues, 
and a chapter in which Prof. Ortwin Renn – who has led this area of work by 
IRGC – itemises the lessons learned from the critiques and case studies as 
well as from IRGC’s experience.
The concept was further developed in the book Risk Governance – Coping 
with Uncertainty in a Complex World (Renn, 2008).
In 2012, the original IRGC approach was modified by Klinke & Renn (2012) 
to add a dynamic, adaptive component, and capture the iterative and 
relational nature of risk governance. The adaptive and integrative quality 
of the process requires the capacity to learn from previous and similar risk-
handling experiences to cope with current and future risk problems. Figure 
8 illustrates this dynamic risk governance process. This model suggests 
four core functions:
• Systematically and consistently complementing the 
relevant risk-handling functions in a risk governance 
cycle.
• Coping with vulnerabilities evoked by generic 
challenges of different orders of uncertainty
• Providing adaptability and flexibility in risk governance 
institutions in response to actual outcome or expected 
consequences which may moderate the estimates 
about the risk.
• Enhancing the resilience of the risk governance 
system by increasing the capacity to retain the basic 
functions and structures of risk handling and to absorb 
disturbance in the risk handling components. Figure 8: Revised risk governance model (Klinke & Renn, 2012)
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In 2014, Rosa, Renn & McCright (2014) shared some of their considerations 
about society, risk and risk governance in their book The Risk Society Revisited. 
They focus in particular on new forms of governance that are needed in 
response to rapidly changing societal conditions such as globalisation and 
the rising phenomenon of systemic risks, which threaten to undermine entire 
systems. This suggests that societies further develop their institutional and 
political means for governing and managing such risks effectively, using an 
analytic-deliberative process.
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APPENDIX 2
APPLICATIONS TO INSTITUTIONAL 
RISK MANAGEMENT
Since its publication in 2005, the IRGC Risk Governance Framework has 
been applied to various risk governance issues in a number of case studies. 
Those test the applicability, efficacy and practicability of the Framework. They 
illustrate that the Framework is a worthwhile basis for diagnosing governance 
deficits, and is broad and flexible enough to be adapted to diverse governance 
issues and contexts.7 
Various organisations use the Framework to structure their thinking and 
inspire guidelines, roadmaps or models. For example:
• US Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff manual 
on Joint Risk Analysis (2016) establishes a Joint Risk Analysis Methodology 
and provides guidance for identifying, assessing, and managing risk. It 
introduces and describes a common risk lexicon to promote consistency 
across the US Department of Defense and Joint Force risk-related 
processes. “Documents from the International Risk Governance Council 
(IRGC) were particularly informative in developing this manual. The IRGC 
white paper, ‘Risk Governance: Towards an Integrative Approach’ provided 
key background and substantiated fundamental concepts used when 
producing this Manual.” 
• United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The Commission 
included a review of the IRGC Risk Governance Framework under “A.2.3 
Risk Governance Framework International Risk Governance Council”, US 
NRC (April 2012). A Proposed Risk Management Regulatory Framework.
• US Department of Homeland Security. US-DHS DHS Risk Lexicon 
(2010): IRGC white paper nr 1 and in particular definitions of risk and 
risk management were used to validate work by the DHS Risk Steering 
Committee (RSC), to produce a lexicon fundamental to the practice of 
homeland security risk management. RSC is the risk governance structure 
for DHS.
• European Commission / Institutions of the European Union. The 
IRGC Risk Governance Framework is a source of information for the 
development of the European Commission Better Regulation, Toolkit #12: 
Risk Assessment & Management.
• CEN Workshop Agreement DIN CWA 16649 on managing emerging 
technology‐related risks. CEN workshop agreements are reference 
documents elaborated under the supervision of the European Committee 
of Standardization. DIN CWA 16649 builds upon the Risk Governance 
7 IRGC case studies are available at http://www.irgc.org/publications
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Framework developed by IRGC and the International Standard ISO 31000. 
It sets the base for a European standard for emerging technology-related 
risks.
• SAFE FOODS. The EU-funded research project SAFE FOODS, Promoting 
Food Safety through a New Integrated Risk Analysis Approach for Foods, 
applied the Risk Governance Framework. The result is the General 
Framework for the Precautionary and Inclusive Governance of Food Safety 
(Dreyer & Renn, 2009) which adapts IRGC’s Risk Governance Framework 
to the specific needs of the European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) (Ely 
et al., 2009). 
• Health Council of the Netherlands. In 2006, the Health Council of 
the Netherlands published the advisory report Health Significance of 
Nanotechnology, which explores governance issues and potential adverse 
effects of nanotechnology. In its advisory report the committee adopts the 
description used by the IRGC: “The IRGC recently presented a general 
framework for risk governance. It corresponds closely with our national 
ideas on dealing with risks and the Committee believes it can also be 
used for dealing with the risks of nanotechnologies.” (Health Council of 
the Netherlands, 2006).
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APPENDIX 3
TWO EMERGING ISSUES WHOSE 
GOVERNANCE CAN BENEFIT 
FROM THE IRGC APPROACH 
(APPLICATION CASES)
Gene drives 8
In sexually reproducing organisms, most genes have a 50% chance of 
being inherited by offspring. However, in some cases natural selection has 
favoured certain genes that are inherited more often. For the past decade 
or so, research 9 has been exploring how this could be triggered. The ‘gene 
drives’ method is a gene editing technique that ‘drives’ a gene through a 
population. It stimulates a gene to be preferentially inherited. Then this gene 
can spread through a given population, whose characteristics could thus be 
modified by the addition, deletion or edition of certain genes. 
Pre-assessment – Gene drives could have large benefits. For instance, 
applications are foreseen in malaria control, where the reprogramming of 
mosquito genomes could potentially eliminate malaria and other insect-borne 
diseases from entire regions. Other potential applications include combating 
herbicide and pesticide resistance or eradicating invasive species, where 
indigenous species provide the basis for local ecosystems diversity but are 
not equipped to resist the new additions. 
Although gene drives hold the promise to cure some of the most severe 
risks to health and the environment, scientists and regulators need to work 
together at an early stage. While there are some technical challenges that 
need to be overcome, there are also some risks that need to be addressed. 
Lastly, all this should not be done without a clear view of the governance 
regime that would apply to gene drives.
Appraisal: Risk assessment – The technical challenges relate first to the 
difficulty of editing genomes for programming drives in a way that is precise 
(only the targeted gene should be affected) and reversible (to prevent and 
overwrite possible unwanted changes). Much progress is being made in this 
area and one can expect the development of purpose-built, engineered gene 
drives in the next few years.10 However, gene drives could also carry potential 
“Gene drives could be used to assist 
in the eradication of insect-borne 
diseases, for example, reducing 
mosquito populations to prevent 
them from transmitting malaria”. 
(http://cser.org/625)
8 Based on (Oye et al., 2014); (Esvelt et al., 2014); (Committee on Gene Drive Research in Non-Human Organisms et al., 2016) 
9 In particular by Prof. Austin Burt, Imperial College London.
10 CRISPR-Cas9 is a tool to accelerate the technology to edit genomes- it enables to rewrite an organism’s DNA.
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risks to wild organisms, crops and livestock. What if an engineered gene drive 
triggers a cascade of unintentional damage in connected ecosystems? At 
this point, risk assessment may have to include the development of various 
scenarios.
Appraisal: Concern assessment – Given the uncertainty about benefit and 
risk, it is important to take into consideration societal perceptions, concerns 
and expectations from gene drive technologies. The discussion of values 
and public engagement is likely to frame the societal, political and regulatory 
response to the risk, and the balancing of potential negative consequences 
with expected benefits. Early engagement could prevent things from spiralling 
out of control.
Evaluation – After assessing the opportunities and the risks, researchers, 
regulators and society will be better equipped to understand the challenges 
involved. They will make a decision about whether to implement the 
technology or not, i.e. whether the risks are acceptable, unacceptable, or 
tolerable, in which case risk management measures must be put in place to 
avoid, prevent or reduce negative consequences. Stakeholders need to agree 
on a governance regime that would govern research, testing and release. 
Like with most technologies that interact with the environment and human 
health, there is high uncertainty as to how the ecosystems will react, so the 
risk will be evaluated in terms of trade-offs. However, there must be research 
into areas of uncertainty, public discussion of security and environmental 
concerns, and development and testing of safety features.
Management – Regulatory frameworks to deal with gene drives vary 
between countries (with different regulatory cultures) and are challenged 
by the evolving technology and supporting science. In January 2017, The 
US published an update of the Coordinated Framework for the Regulation 
of Biotechnology, which addresses specific regulatory issues, with the aim 
to make it more adaptable and responsive to change. Sound and proactive 
governance implies that the potential opportunities of new technologies are 
accompanied by the development of governance standards or regulatory 
regimes to oversee both unintentional and intentional damage caused by 
the technology. In the absence of scientific certainty and to account for the 
fast-moving development of the science, regulations and conventions must 
be adaptive to new information on benefits, risk and governance deficits. 
Adaptive and flexible regulatory frameworks are being tested in other 
fields (see Box 11), and could provide both sufficient stability and room 
for adaptation before gene drives are released in the open environment. 
Such frameworks should also include a multi-stakeholder view on benefits 
and risks, cutting across organisations with diverse interests, allowing an 
inclusive and informed public discussion to determine when and how gene 
drives should be used.
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The European Commission provides 
support for more connectivity, 
cooperation and automation to 
address challenges and reap benefits 
on mobility in Europe. Cooperative, 
connected and automated mobility 
and digitisation promise to address 
challenges and expectations on 
mobility such as:
- growing demand for more safety 
and sustainability.
- environmental concerns.
- economic concerns.
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single- 
market/en/cooperative-connected-
and-automated-mobility-europe 
11 Analysis based on discussions at an IRGC workshop on autonomous cars. See https://www.irgc.org/issues/autonomous-cars.
Automated and connected cars 11
Automated driving and car connectivity is being developed by numerous car 
manufacturers and service operators, and in in many countries, with expected 
benefits in car and road safety, and traffic fluidity. Technologies for sensing 
the car environment are developing fast, with the potential for large scale 
deployment. However, there are risks that must be considered. Applying the 
IRGC Risk Governance Framework can help identify the important steps and 
tasks for governing the risks.
Pre-assessment – In order to establish the context and frame the issue, the 
following questions could guide decision-makers: Why do some stakeholders 
wish to develop autonomous driving? For what benefits? Who are the 
stakeholders? Are some stakeholders opposed to autonomous driving? 
What do we know about safety issues and other risks? Do current regulations 
allow autonomous driving? The outcome of the pre-assessment could be 
in the form of mapping the issues at stake, including the stakeholders and 
their interests, constraints and views.
Appraisal: Risk assessment – There are a number of technical risks involved, 
including safety risks, risks associated with geo-localisation and connectivity 
between vehicles and with infrastructure, risks related to processing data 
from sensors and from infrastructure, cybersecurity, privacy issues, legal 
issues and business risks.
Appraisal: Concern assessment – Public perception surveys indicate that 
while most people are generally in favour, some people would prefer not to use 
autonomous cars themselves. However, attitudes are changing very rapidly.
Evaluation – Allowing autonomous cars on the roads will be a question 
of trade-offs between risks and opportunities. It will depend on the safety 
level that road users accept and on expected benefits in mobility and 
transportation. Decisions about the pace and conditions of authorisation 
(and/or mandating devices and features for sensing, automation, connectivity 
and autonomy) of automated cars on the roads will thus result from resolving 
the trade-offs between various types of issues including national priorities 
and preferences (competitiveness of national industry), consumer preferences 
and mobility services. A critical determinant of the decision will be how 
authorities and individuals will answer the question of When will autonomous 
cars be safe enough to be fully authorised on public roads? Those evaluating 
these conditions will also identify and prepare risk management options, 
considering the role of insurance to determine the acceptability of the 
remaining risk, the role of public regulation / litigation, and the role of private 
standards, certification, and homologation.
Management of the risks and opportunities – A diverse set of measures 
will most probably be put in place. These measures will affect public road 
traffic regulation, vehicle safety, standards, certification, product and criminal 
liability laws, data security / privacy and cybersecurity, among other aspects.
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APPENDIX 4
OTHER IRGC PUBLICATIONS  
ON CONCEPTS AND INSTRUMENTS 
FOR RISK GOVERNANCE 12
Since 2005, IRGC has continued to develop concepts and instruments to 
support the work of risk assessors, managers, regulators and decision-makers.
Assessing and managing risk governance deficits
IRGC defines a risk governance deficit as a failure or deficiency in the 
identification, framing, assessment, management and communication of a 
risk issue or of how it is being addressed. Governance deficits are common 
and their recognition often serves to understand why risk management does 
not perform as expected. They can be remedied or mitigated. IRGC has 
identified 10 common deficits in risk assessment and 12 common deficits 
in risk management.
• Risk Governance Deficits (Report, 2009) 
• Risk Governance Deficits (Policy Brief, 2010) 
Governance of emerging risks 
IRGC defines emerging risks as new risks or familiar risks that become 
apparent in new or unfamiliar conditions. Emerging risks are issues that are 
perceived to be potentially significant but which may not be fully understood 
and assessed, thus not allowing risk management options to be developed 
with confidence. 
• IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance (Report, 2015) 
• Appendix to the IRGC Guidelines for Emerging Risk Governance (Appendix, 
2015) 
• Improving the Management of Emerging Risks (Concept Note, 2011) 
• The Emergence of Risks: Contributing Factors (Report, 2010) 
Systemic risks
Based on work on ‘slow-developing catastrophic risks’ and resilience, 
IRGC is currently developing guidelines for the governance of systemic 
risks in the context of transitions, which complement the IRGC Risk Gov-
ernance Framework on specific aspects. 
Specific issues
IRGC also works in-depth on a number of issues that benefit from a risk 
governance approach, such as cybersecurity, precision medicine, or synthetic 
biology.
12  All IRGC publications are available on www.irgc.org/publications
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This document is a brief summary of the main concepts of the IRGC Risk 
Governance Framework. The Framework was developed by a team of risk 
experts chaired by Prof. Ortwin Renn. This revised version of this Introduction 
to the Framework was prepared following a workshop at IASS, Potsdam, in 
October 2016, at which participants from science and policy made a number 
of suggestions, primarily to clarify or simplify some concepts, illustrate with 
recent examples and adapt with advances in the field of risk analysis. The 
fundamental concepts remain the same as those described in 2005. 
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